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ABSTRACT: What the rational thing to do in the face of disagreement by an epistemic peer is has 
been much discussed recently. Those who think that a peer’s disagreement is itself evidence 
against one’s belief, as many do, are committed to a special form of epistemic dependence. If 
such disagreement is really evidence, it seems reasonable to take it into account and to  adjust 
one’s belief accordingly. But then it seems that the belief one ends up with depends, in part, on 
what someone else believes, even if one does not now why that someone believes what he does. 
While the practical impossibility of finding actual cases of peer disagreement has been often not-
ed, its conceptual possibility has gone unquestioned. Here we challenge this consensus and ar-
gue, first, that, strictly speaking, peer disagreement is impossible and, second, that cases of – all-
too-common – near-peer disagreement present no special puzzle and require nothing more than 
adhering to standard principles of sensible epistemic conduct. In particular, we argue that in such 
cases there is no good reason to adopt the widely accepted principle that evidence of evidence is 
evidence. If so, even if one takes a near-peer’s disagreement as a reason for re-examining one’s 
belief, one is not epistemically dependent in the sense one would be if that disagreement were 
evidence concerning the matter in question. 
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 What the rational thing to do in the face of disagreement by an epistemic peer is has been 
much discussed recently. Those who think that a peer’s disagreement is itself evidence against 
one’s belief, as many do, are committed to a special form of epistemic dependence. If such dis-
agreement is really evidence, it seems reasonable to take it into account and to  adjust one’s be-
lief accordingly. But then it seems that the belief one ends up with depends, in part, on what 
someone else believes, even if one does not now why that someone believes what he does. While 
the practical impossibility of finding actual cases of peer disagreement has been often noted, its 
conceptual possibility has gone unquestioned. Here we challenge this consensus and argue, first, 
that, strictly speaking, peer disagreement is impossible and, second, that cases of – all-too-com-
mon – near-peer disagreement present no special puzzle and require nothing more than adhering 
to standard principles of sensible epistemic conduct. In particular, we argue that in such cases 
there is no good reason to adopt the widely accepted principle that evidence of evidence is evi-
dence. If so, even if one takes a near-peer’s disagreement as a reason for re-examining one’s be-
lief, one is not epistemically dependent in the sense one would be if that disagreement were evi-
dence concerning the matter in question. 
Disagreement is often taken to be puzzling if it involves these elements: two parties with 
equal intellectual virtues and abilities, the same evidence regarding some proposition p, full dis-
closure of the evidence between the parties, yet disagreement over the truth-value of p. Here are 
some well-known examples: 
Feldman’s Quad: Two people are standing by the window looking out on the quad. They 
seem to be equal in intellectual virtue and cognitive ability. One claims to be seeing the 
Dean standing in the middle of the quad, the other disagrees. They are both confident in 
their beliefs, taking themselves to be correct.   1
Christensen’s Restaurant: Two philosophers go out to dinner. Again, they fulfill the con-
ditions for intellectual parity. When the check comes, one calculates each share as $43, 
 Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism 1
and the Secular, ed. Louise Anthony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 194-214.
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whereas the other gets to a different result, say, $45. They are both confident that they 
have got it right.  2
Kelly’s Courtroom: You and I are members of a jury determining whether the accused is 
guilty. After both the prosecution and the defense rest, we have to come to a decision. We 
have equally good judgment and the same evidence. My verdict is guilty, yours, innocent. 
We are equally confident in our rightness.  3
Intuitions about what one should do in cases like these vary. Some have defended the view that 
in such cases one should lower one’s confidence in one’s belief. Thus David Christensen says 
that in the restaurant case I should give equal credence to my belief that my share of the bill is 
$43 and to my colleague’s belief that it is $45. But why should we think that? The answer, ac-
cording to Christensen, is that since my peer and I are in a symmetrical position from an epis-
temic point of view, there is no reason for me to believe that my peer is wrong in this case apart 
from the disagreement itself, but our disagreement gives me no reason to demote my colleague 
from being my peer. For insofar as I can use our disagreement as evidence that my peer is wrong, 
thereby holding fast to my previous belief that my share is $43, my peer could easily do the 
same. I could reasonably demote my colleague from being a peer only if I have reasons that are 
independent of my own reasoning in support of my original belief. If such reasons are lacking, 
there is no reason to believe that either of us has the epistemic upper hand. Rather, we should 
take peer disagreement as an opportunity to revise our beliefs – an opportunity, as Christensen 
says, for epistemic improvement.  Conciliation is called for.  4 5
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 A similar, but in some sense stronger position, was at one time defended by Richard 
Feldman. Take any of the three scenarios above and let the parties come to full disclosure of the 
evidence, that is, let both know that they have the same evidence. There are three doxastic op-
tions available to them: belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief. Let a reasonable disagreement 
be such that both parties to it are justified in the beliefs they hold.  Feldman argues that a single 
body of evidence cannot justify more than one attitude towards a proposition, and since the par-
ties have the same evidence after full disclosure, they cannot be justified in either believing or 
disbelieving the relevant proposition.  If after full disclosure of the evidence they find them6 -
selves in disagreement, they should suspend judgment regarding the question. Since there is no 
reasonable disagreement possible after full disclosure of the evidence, the parties cannot justifi-
ably draw different conclusions from the same evidence. Suspension of belief is the only reason-
able option in cases of such disagreement.   7
 More recently, Feldman has come to defend a weaker position: what has been called the 
Total Evidence View, which is also championed by Thomas Kelly.  According to this, one’s re8 -
sponse to a peer’s disagreeing should be governed by one’s total evidence, which consists of 
one’s first-order evidence, i.e., the original evidence on which one formed one’s belief, and the 
higher-order evidence consisting of the fact that one’s peer disagrees. The impact and the com-
plexity of the total evidence varies in each case, but first-order evidence still counts after full dis-
closure of the evidence. Thus even though there may be cases where suspension of judgment is 
called for, there may also be cases in which one should hold fast to one’s belief.  As a matter of 9
fact, Kelly says that “there is certainly no guarantee that the uniquely reasonable response on 
your part is to retreat to a state of agnosticism between your original opinion and my original 
 “…a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of propositions…” Feldman, “Rea6 -
sonable Religious Disagreements,” 205, and “…it cannot be that epistemic peers who have shared their evidence can 
reasonably come to different conclusions.” Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 213.
 Note that Feldman does not question the possibility of peer disagreement, only its reasonableness. We will argue 7
that if two people are really epistemic peers, there cannot be unreasonable disagreement between them, either.
 See Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” Episteme 6, 3 (2009): 294-312, and 8
Kelly, “Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.”
 Cf. Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” 311.9
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opinion,”  as suggested, for instance, by Christensen’s conciliationism. The reasonable response 10
to disagreement depends on the combination of first-order evidence and the higher-order evi-
dence “afforded by the fact that one’s peers believe as they do.”  What to do when a peer dis11 -
agrees with you should be dictated by your judgment about your epistemic situation, and not by a 
general epistemic norm requiring agnosticism. 
 Differing as they do in their answer to how to respond to disagreement by a peer, all these 
writers take such disagreement to have evidential import. More than that, in the case where you 
believe that p, they take the fact that your peer disagrees with you as evidence against p. Thus, as 
mentioned above, Kelly takes the fact that one’s peer disagrees with one as higher-order evidence 
that should be added to one’s “stock of evidence” ; Christensen says that “the peer’s disagree12 -
ment gives one evidence that one has made a mistake in interpreting the original evidence, and 
that such evidence should diminish one’s confidence in P” ; and Feldman says that “the proposi13 -
tion that S’s peer - whose evidence concerning p is the same as S’s - disbelieves p is evidence 
against p.”  Therefore, in each of the aforementioned cases where one believes that p, peer dis14 -
agreement is taken as evidence that p is false: one should consider whether one’s belief that p is 
still supported by the total evidence, which now includes the evidence that one’s peer disagrees 
with one, and  withhold belief or at least believe that p less confidently than before. And, of 
course, they all take it for granted that there can be such a thing as disagreement between epis-
temic peers. In section I we distinguish between strict peers and near-peers and argue that, on the 
account of peer-hood accepted by these and most other writers on the subject,  there can be no 
such thing as peer disagreement. In section II we argue that in cases of disagreement between 
near-peers, which is, indeed, common, the near-peer’s disagreement is not evidence against the 
 Kelly, “Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment,” 35.10
 Thomas Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” in Disagreement, eds. Richard Feldman and Ted 11
Warfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 142.
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 5
proposition one believes. It may be a reason for re-examining one’s evidence and one’s assess-
ment of it, but that should not be taken to be the same thing as having evidence against what one 
believes.  
I. Is peer disagreement possible? 
There are several slightly different characterizations of peer-hood in the recent literature. Gener-
ally, peers are characterized as having the same, or, at least, approximately the same, evidence, 
intellectual virtues and abilities. Thus, Feldman defines epistemic peers as being “roughly equal 
with respect to intelligence, reasoning powers, background information, and so on.”  Chris15 -
tensen claims they are approximately equals “in terms of exposure to the evidence, intelligence, 
freedom from bias, etc.”  Stewart Cohen says with respect to peers that “there is enough shared 16
evidence that there is no reason to suppose that either party (…) is in an evidentially superior po-
sition.”  Moreover, peers must be “in general equal in their reasoning abilities, or at least, close 17
enough so there is no basis for supposing either party is in general the superior reasoner.”  This 18
does not guarantee, however, that they will employ their equal competence in examining the evi-
dence equally well. That is why Christensen says that they should also “react to that evidence in 
the right way,”  and Ernest Sosa emphasizes that peer-hood also depends on “how likely you are 19
to employ [your general competences].”  Gary Gutting describes peers as being equals in “intel20 -
ligence, perspicacity, honesty, thoroughness, and other relevant epistemic virtues.”  Kelly char21 -
 Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 201.15
 Christensen, “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy,” 756.16
 Stewart Cohen, “A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Eights View,” in Christensen and Lackey, The Epistemology of 17
Disagreement: New Essays, 98-99.
 Cohen, “A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Eights View,” 99.18
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acterizes peers concerning a particular question as “equals with respect to their familiarity with 
the evidence and arguments which bear on that question,”  and also says that “they are equals 22
with respect to general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from 
bias.”  It is sometimes stressed that peers should be equals in general epistemic competence, 23
sometimes that they must be equals with respect to the particular question they disagree about. 
Hence, there is a distinction between being a peer in general and being a peer concerning some 
proposition p.   24
However, sometimes it is stipulated that two peers must have literally the same evidence 
regarding p. According to Feldman and Warfield, we have “….peers literally share all evidence 
and are equal with respect to their abilities and disposition relevant to interpreting that 
evidence.”  As will become clear, we think that the difference between the two characterizations 25
– ‘roughly equal’ v. ‘literally equal’ – makes all the difference, and even though it is sometimes 
observed in the literature, it is usually not carefully observed. It is important to notice that both 
Gutting’s and Kelly’s characterizations of peers mention that they must be ‘equals,’ and not just 
approximately equals. Sometimes, this distinction is not even observed by the same author, for if 
we continue the passage we cited from Cohen, for instance, we have the following: “When par-
ties to a disagreement have the same evidence and are equal in their reasoning abilities, they are 
epistemic peers.”  26
Of course, this may just be a loose way of putting things, but we will argue that the dif-
ference is by no means insignificant. We think we should draw a distinction between epistemic 
peers in the strict sense (EP) and epistemic near-peers (ENP): 
 Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol 1, eds. 22
Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 175.
 Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 175.23
 Nathan King, “Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard to Find,” Philosophy and Phenome24 -
nological Research 85, 2 (2012): 249-72, is a good source for the conditions for peer-hood assumed in the recent 
literature.
 Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield, “Introduction,” in Feldman and Warfield, Disagreement, 2.25
 Cohen, “A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Eights View,” 99.26
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(EP)     A and B are epistemic peers with respect to p iff they have identical evidence con-
cerning p, equal cognitive abilities in general, and are equal in their employment 
of those cognitive abilities with respect to p and evidence they have. 
(ENP)  A and B are epistemic near-peers with respect to p iff they have approximately the 
same evidence concerning p, approximately the same cognitive abilities in gener-
al, and are approximately equal in their employment of those cognitive abilities 
with respect to p and the evidence they have. 
According to (EP), epistemic peers are epistemically identical with respect to p. Let A 
and B be peers, i.e., let them satisfy (EP) for some proposition p, and let EA be A’s body of evi-
dence and EB B’s. It follows from (EP) that EA=EB. Now, suppose that A believes that p based on 
EA, but B demurs. Then either B does not accept EA or she does but does not believe that if EA, 
then p. If the former, EA≠EB, contrary to the assumption. If the latter, either A and B do not have 
the same cognitive abilities or they are not employing those abilities in the same way. One way 
or the other, the mere fact that A and B disagree shows that they are not epistemic peers as de-
fined in (EP). 
Broadly speaking, there are two general conceptions of evidence. Either evidence is ex-
hausted by one’s mental states – the internal conception of evidence – or it includes facts about 
the world – the external conception.  We take for granted that most writers assume an internalist 27
position, but all the above holds on either conception. Whether EA  and EB  are thought of as con-
sisting exclusively of internal states of A and B or not, what matters for present purposes is that 
they be thought of as identical. 
It may be objected, however, that this is too strong. Even if we ignore all the many non-
epistemic differences between A and B – as we may be entitled to do here – one crucial epistemic 
difference may remain. Suppose A is a brain in a vat and B is not. Then, even if (EP) is satisfied, 
A and B will differ in that A’s beliefs will be false and B’s true. But this objection has no teeth in 
 Conee and Feldman’s account of evidence as occurrent thoughts is an instance of the former. See   Earl Conee and 27
Richard Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. The account in 
Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 184-208, is one of the lat-
ter.
 8
the present context. Saying that A and B are epistemic twins (as we will, in what follows), rather 
than epistemically identical makes no difference with respect to the present point. As long as the 
only epistemic difference between A and B is that their beliefs differ in truth value, disagreement 
between them is ruled out by (EP).  28
Another objection may be that non-epistemic differences cannot be ignored, since they 
may lead two people to evaluate p differently, even if they satisfy (EP). They may disagree for 
practical or psychological reasons. But if they disagree for non-epistemic reasons, we obviously 
do not have a case of epistemic disagreement. I may have good reasons to disagree with you 
about p when p is a live, forced, or momentous question for me but not for you: you are willing 
to accept p given E, whereas I, having more at stake, require more.  But then, again, you and I 29
are not employing our cognitive capacities in the same way.  Such disagreements do not pose a 30
question for the epistemology of disagreement.   31
An arguably more epistemically relevant case is one in which the parties have different 
insights:  
Each may have his or her own special insight or sense of obviousness. But each knows 
about the other’s insight. Each knows that this insight has evidential force. And now I see 
 Sosa discusses cases where disagreement is sufficient to demote the other party from being a peer. Take, for in28 -
stance, a disagreement about whether you are in a certain mental state. (Sosa uses a headache as example). In this 
case, the only evidence I have is that you say you are. If I disagree “you would be reasonable to downgrade your 
opponent based essentially on your disagreement, even with no independent reason for doing so.” Sosa, “The Epis-
temology of Disagreement,” 287. Nevertheless, Sosa points out that it is not easy to demote somebody from being a 
peer in “issues subject to troubling, persistent disagreement are not properly decidable in the absence of ulterior rea-
sons.” Sosa, “The Epistemology of Disagreement,” 287.
 We borrow here from William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays, New York: Longmans, Green, and 29
Co., 1897, 2-3. 
 So-called attributor contextualism makes much of the difference between ‘high-stakes’ and ‘low-stakes’ situations 30
with respect to knowledge attributions. Without endorsing that – we think, dubious – doctrine, we are deploying a 
similar distinction with respect to belief. (See, for example, Stewart Cohen, “Knowledge and Context,” The Journal 
of Philosophy 83, 10 (1986): 574-583, and Keith DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 52, 4 (1992): 913-929.) (More on the distinction between having evidence and 
having good reasons in section II.)
 Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 205-6, discusses a similar case regarding disagreement result31 -
ing from opposing worldviews or starting points (see also Harvey Siegel, “Argumentation and the Epistemology of 
Disagreement,” Cogency 5, 1 (2013): 135-170, for a discussion of "deep" disagreement). For a much earlier discus-
sion on this, see Robert Fogelin, “The Logic of Deep Disagreements,” Informal Logic 7, 1 (1985): 3-11.
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no basis for either of them justifying his own belief simply because the one insight hap-
pens to occur inside of him. A point about evidence that plays a role here is this: evidence 
of evidence is evidence. More carefully, evidence that there is evidence for P is evidence 
for P. Knowing that the other has an insight provides each of them with evidence.  32
But here, again, if A and B have different insights with different evidential force, they do 
not satisfy (EP). If you have a revelation or vision that I do not have, we have different evidence 
and are thus not peers. If you are convinced by the argument from design and I am not, we differ 
in how we assess the evidence we both have and are thus not peers.   33
Catherine Elgin has argued that a definition of peer-hood such as (EP) is too narrow and 
that for that reason it is not helpful in understanding real-world disagreement. She says that  
in the recent debates about disagreement ‘epistemic peer’ is defined quite narrowly. It re-
quires having the same evidence, and reasoning abilities. So it is not surprising if an ordi-
nary person lacks epistemic peers with respect to a particular, mundane issue. If Jen and 
Jon have even slightly different relevant reasoning abilities or evidence pertaining to the 
causes of the Civil War, they are not epistemic peers with respect to the subject. Given 
the vicissitudes of education and abilities, and the idiosyncrasies of evidence gathering, 
ordinary epistemic agents are apt to have few epistemic peers.   34 35
Elgin is correct in observing that peer-hood as defined in (EP) is an idealization, and that 
we need a more generous account of it to deal with real-world cases of disagreement, one on 
which two disagreeing parties have only “pretty much the same evidence, reasoning powers, 
 Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 208.32
 The same goes for Conee’s suggestion about different intuitions. See Earl Conee, “Rational Disagreement De33 -
fended,” in Feldman and Warfield, Disagreement, 69-90.
 Catherine Elgin, “Persistent Disagreement,” in Feldman and Warfield, Disagreement, 56-57.34
 Similar doubts about the possibility of strict peer-hood are voiced by Jonathan Matheson, “Disagreement: Ideal35 -
ized and Everyday,” in The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, eds. Jonathan Matheson and Rico Vitz (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 315-330, King, “Disagreement: What’s the Problem? or A Good Peer is Hard 
to Find,” and Siegel, “Argumentation and the Epistemology of Disagreement.” 
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training, and background information.”  (57) This echoes Feldman’s requirement that they be 36
“roughly equal,” which we believe is captured by (ENP).  In section II we will discuss cases in-
volving epistemic near-peers, which may capture the more ‘generous account’ that Elgin has in 
mind. However, Elgin’s criticism of the stricter notion of peer-hood is very different from ours. 
We do not say that (EP) should be abandoned in favour of a more generous account, given its 
inapplicability in the real world. Our claim is, rather, that peer disagreement in the ideal case is 
impossible. Elgin does not seem to realize this, for she goes on to say that her solution to cases of 
near-peer disagreement also works if the “standard conception of an epistemic peer is used.”  37
And, by “standard” here she means (EP).  38
Thus we agree that genuine peer disagreement in the strict sense of peer-hood is prob-
lematic, but not because it is rare or hard to come by. We maintain that if peer disagreement is 
understood as in (EP), there could not be such a thing. There can, of course, be disagreement be-
tween apparent epistemic peers, who appear to be ]such because they satisfy (EPN) and are, in 
Feldman’s words, roughly equal. This is also what Elgin’s “generous” characterization of peers 
comes to. Whatever one calls it, it amounts to a more permissive definition of peer-hood, taking 
into account at least some differences in the evidence or the intellectual capacities (or both) of 
the disagreeing parties. Thus, you may appear to be my peer as defined in (EP) and yet disagree 
with me. Indeed, such cases are common. To appear to be my peer, you must be my near-peer; if 
you were not, it would very likely be obvious that you are not. In such a case, if I understand 
peer-hood a la (EP), I know that you cannot be my peer. What I do not know is whether you are 
my epistemic superior or my epistemic inferior, that is to say, whether you are more or less com-
petent or have stronger or weaker evidence or both.  If I believed you to be my superior, I would 39
 Elgin, “Persistent Disagreement,” 57.36
 Elgin, “Persistent Disagreement,” 57.37
 It is not clear whether one should regard (EP) or (ENP) the “standard” conception of peer-hood – if, indeed, there 38
is one at all. We take this to be at least partly due to the back and forth between ‘equal’ and ‘approximately equal’ in 
the definitions of peer-hood, and also to a certain looseness or lack of precision in many definitions, as illustrated 
above. In any case, we use ‘peer’ for the strict case, (EP), and ‘near-peer’ for the notion defined in (ENP).
 This is a broad definition of epistemic superiority. Some may prefer a narrower one, focusing only on better or 39
superior cognitive ability. This makes no difference to the present argument.
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have reason to defer, if to be my inferior, to stand firm. So far I have no reason for doing either; 
thus Feldman is right that suspension of judgment is called for. However, to agree that suspen-
sion of judgment is called for pro tem is not to agree that that is all that is called for. Other, obvi-
ous, things to do are to re-examine both bodies of evidence and to look for additional evidence. 
We know that we cannot both be right (though we could both be wrong). We therefore know that 
one of three things must be true. One of us may be misjudging the evidence he has, the evidence 
one of us has may be misleading, or there is other evidence to be found that would tip the scales 
one way or the other.  
 I may not know which of us is epistemically superior, but your disagreeing gives me rea-
son to try to find out, and what better way than to ask you. Suppose you claim to have evidence I 
do not have. If I believe you and think you my epistemic equal in other respects, I should defer, 
if I do not believe you or think you epistemically inferior, I should not. Whichever the case, I do 
not take myself to be deferring to, or refusing to defer to, an epistemic peer. Suppose you claim 
that the evidence we both have shows something different than what I think it does. I ask you to 
explain and either accept your explanation or do not. Doing the first is tantamount to deeming 
you my epistemic superior, doing the second, my inferior. Again, I do not take myself to be de-
ferring to, or refusing to defer to, an epistemic peer. Whatever I do, I do precisely because I do 
not take us to be the epistemic peers we may have appeared to be – the mere fact that we dis-
agree is proof that I am right in this. 
Thus in Christensen’s example, we both know that (at least) one of us is mistaken. Given 
that our evidence is obviously the same, it follows that we are not equal in our cognitive abilities 
– or, at least, in our employment of them with respect to the matter in question – and that we 
both know this.  If each one of us is confident that he is right, as Christensen says, that is tanta-
mount to his thinking that the other is his epistemic inferior. However, such confidence is com-
patible with thinking that it may, after all, turn out to be the other way around. Hence the only 
sensible thing to do is to set about finding out which of us is mistaken. This is, obviously, what 
two rational people finding themselves in such a situation would do: they would go over the bill 
together. Similar remarks may be made about Feldman’s case (“Fetch the binoculars!”). Dis-
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agreement of this sort is, indeed, occasion for epistemic improvement. But that is not the same 
thing as “giving equal credence” to a proposition one does not believe and for which one’s only 
evidence is that someone who may or may not be one’s epistemic superior believes it. 
Distinguishing between higher-order evidence, as do Kelly and (now) Feldman, makes no 
difference to any of this. If my total evidence includes evidence that you have come to a different 
belief on the basis of  first-order evidence we both have, we do not satisfy (EP) with respect to 
parity of cognitive ability. Furthermore, (EP) cannot be satisfied with respect to total evidence so 
understood. You and I cannot have the same total evidence, as mine will include evidence of 
your disagreeing with me and yours will include evidence of my disagreeing with you.  40
II. Near-peer disagreement and evidence of evidence 
a) Evidence of what?  
While there can be no such thing as peer disagreement strictly speaking, cases of near-peer dis-
agreement are not uncommon. We have suggested that in such cases there is no need to look for 
any special principle telling the near-peers how they should react to their disagreement: general 
principles of sensible epistemic conduct are all they need to employ. Some, however, take the 
fact that a near-peer disagrees with one as itself evidence against one’s position and argue that it 
is sufficient for giving up one’s position, either suspending belief (Feldman) or going as far as 
deferring to one’s disputant (Christensen). 
Feldman takes the following principle to be the “key evidential fact about 
disagreements”:  
 Our total evidence can be the same if we ignore the indexical aspect and focus on the character of the sentence 40
describing the higher-order evidence, rather than on its content. If the evidence is described only as one’s peer’s dis-
agreeing, we may both be said to have it.  But then if we have the same total evidence and still disagree, that must be 
because we are not equals in cognitive ability.
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(KEF)    The proposition that S’s peer - whose evidence concerning p is the same as S’s - 
disbelieves p is evidence against p.   41 42
 The first problem with (KEF) is that it does not capture the idea behind the slogan ‘evi-
dence of evidence is evidence’, as it is presumably intended to do.  If my peer’s evidence is re43 -
ally the same as mine, our disagreement can be put down only to superior cognitive ability on the 
part of one or other of us. Rational disagreement can be explained only by one party’s having 
either more evidence or better judgment. (KEF) explicitly rules out the former, so only the latter 
can be in play. Then the only thing of which my peer’s disagreeing with me can be evidence of is 
that one of us has better judgment than the other.  But that is not evidence that his judgment is 
better than mine. 
 In any case, what is presumably intended is that in having evidence that you do not be-
lieve what I believe I have evidence that you have evidence against what I believe – rather than 
that your judgment is better than mine – and that gives me evidence that what I believe is false. 
As already noted, as long as we differ in either our evidence or in our cognitive ability, we can-
not be peers strictly speaking. Since disagreement between peers is impossible, our disagreement 
shows that we are not. (KEF), if taken to be about strict peers, is incoherent, requiring as it does 
thinking of the parties as both peers and not peers.  
 Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” 298.41
 Disbelieving a proposition may be taken to mean not believing it or believing its negation. Thus one’s peer may 42
disagree with one either by denying what one believes or by merely refusing to affirm it. Feldman’s ‘evidence 
against p’ suggests that he has the former in mind. It is not clear whether he intends the principle to apply in the lat-
ter case. (In what follows we will mean by ‘peer’ ‘near-peer’ as defined in (ENP).
 Feldman has different formulations of the principle ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’ in “Reasonable Religious 43
Disagreements,” 208, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” 308, and in Richard Feldman, 
“Evidence of Evidence is Evidence,” in Matheson and Vitz, The Ethics of Belief, 292. (KEF) is supposed to be a 
principle about epistemic support (cf. Feldman, “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement,” 298), 
specifically in cases of peer disagreement. We believe there is an ambiguity in Feldman’s different formulations. 
While Branden Fitelson, “Evidence of Evidence is not (Necessarily) Evidence,” Analysis 72, 1 (2012): 85-88, and 
Juan Comesaña and Eyal Tal , “Evidence of Evidence is Evidence (Trivially),” Analysis 75, 4 (2015): 557-559, dis-
cuss (EEE) assuming that the evidence one has is evidence of what the evidence the other has is (or is not, in Fitel-
son’s case), we take it to mean only that it is evidence that the other has some (or something he takes to be – see be-
low)  evidence. For more on this, see Fabio Lampert and John Biro, “What is Evidence of Evidence Evidence of?” 
Logos and Episteme VIII, 2 (2017): 195-206.
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 A recognition of this may lie behind Feldman’s characterization of epistemic peers as 
"roughly equal" in their evidence and cognitive abilities; in effect, as only near-peers.  However, 44
insisting, as we have repeatedly, that any difference in what evidence two people possess or in 
their cognitive ability entails that they are not peers is no mere pedantry. We will argue that if 
one’s disagreement is with someone who is only roughly one’s peer, no special problem arises. 
More investigation, concerning the evidence the other has or his cognitive abilities (or both) is all 
that is required.   
 Feldman thinks otherwise. He thinks that in cases of what we are calling near-peer dis-
agreement the following principle of evidence holds: 
(EEE) Evidence that S’s near-peer disbelieves p is evidence against p. 
Thus when one learns that one’s near-peer does not believe what one does, one acquires evidence 
against what one believes. 
One problem with this is that the evidence I have for the proposition that you do not be-
lieve that p is evidence only that you take yourself to have evidence that p is false.  Even sup45 -
posing that my evidence that you do is good evidence that you do (which it may not be), the truth 
of that proposition is compatible not only with p’s being true but with my not having any evi-
dence that p is false. Suppose I believe that the accused is innocent and you say that you believe 
him guilty. Assuming that you are sincere and you believe what you do because you take your-
self to have evidence of his guilt, is the evidence I have – that you take yourself to have such ev-
idence – evidence that the accused is guilty? Surely, only if I think that the evidence you take 
yourself to have is good evidence. If the evidence in question is misleading, your having it gives 
me no reason to believe what you do.  
It is one thing to have evidence that p and another to have evidence that is good evidence 
that p. Since ‘evidence that p’ may be taken to mean either, for all I know, what you have might 
 Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 201, our emphasis.44
 Or that you see the evidence we both have as evidence for –p, rather than for p. For now, we ignore this possibili45 -
ty, though we will come back to it later. In any case, part of the assumption is that S’s near-peer disbelieves p be-
cause of what she deems to be evidence against it.
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be misleading evidence. If that is the case, the fact that you disbelieve p does not speak against p. 
To decide whether it does so, I must find out what your evidence is and weigh it myself to the 
best of my ability. If I decide that your evidence is good evidence, that is tantamount to deciding 
that, in coming to believe what you did, you were my epistemic superior. Now that I have the 
evidence you have, we are again epistemic peers – but given that I think the evidence in question 
is good evidence, we no longer disagree. 
We should thus distinguish between two senses of ‘evidence,’ the neutral sense and the 
probative sense, as we may dub them. Accordingly, ‘S has evidence that p’ may mean one of two 
things. It may mean that E (where E is some proposition, state of affairs, fact – it does not matter 
which) is taken by S to speak in favour of p. In this sense, something is evidence if it is deemed 
to be so, and to say that S has evidence that p is not to say that what he has is evidence that sup-
ports p. In the latter, probative sense, to say that S has evidence that p is to say that S has evi-
dence that does speak in favour of p.  
In which of these two senses should we understand ‘evidence’ as it occurs in (EEE)? If in 
the first, the principle asserts merely that A has evidence (in one or the other sense) that B takes 
himself to have evidence that speaks in favour of p. But that should be of interest to A only if he 
has reason to believe that B is his epistemic superior.  
 Suppose that A’s evidence is B’s saying that he has evidence and A takes that as evidence 
that B has probative evidence that p. He would be mistaken if B were lying. Even if B is truthful, 
he may be mistaken:  the evidence he takes to be probative may not be. In neither case does A 
have probative evidence that p. For (EEE) to have the bite it is thought to have, the second occur-
rence of ‘evidence’ must be understood in the probative sense. The trouble is that A (and we) 
have no grounds for thinking that the evidence B has is probative unless we know what that evi-
dence is and judge it to be such. His disagreeing does not by itself constitute such grounds.  
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Let us label the two occurrences of ‘evidence’ in (EEE) as ‘evidence1’ and ‘evidence2’.  46
What we are interested in is whether someone asserting (EEE) is right in claiming, as its propo-
nents appear to, that ‘evidence2’ is probative, that it speaks in favour of, or against, the proposi-
tion in dispute. 
Imagine that we learn from a reliable source that a respected colleague has been claiming 
that LBJ was behind the assassination of JFK. We have evidence that he takes himself to have 
good evidence for the claim. Until we see what that evidence is, however, we have good reason 
to think him a whacko. Our evidence that he takes himself to have good evidence clearly does 
not mean that we have good evidence, not even that we have what we (perhaps mistakenly) take 
to be good evidence. Suppose that we learn what he takes to be evidence, and it is whacky; now 
we have good evidence that he is a whacko. Suppose, on the other hand, that we find the evi-
dence he takes to be good evidence. Now we indeed have (what we take to be good) evidence 
ourselves. But this does not help (EEE). The evidence we now have that LBJ was involved is 
more than just that our colleague has what he takes to be good evidence, which is all we had be-
fore and which (EEE) says is sufficient for us to have evidence – indeed, good evidence – that 
LBJ was involved.  Thus it is a mistake to say that “… mere disagreement… is in general a per47 -
fectly legitimate piece of evidence … and so often a good enough reason to demote [someone] 
from the status of a peer.”  48
 Following (loosely) Richard Feldman, “Evidence of Evidence is Evidence,” Keynote lecture at Feldmania: A 46
Conference in Honor of Richard Feldman, UT San Antonio, 2011, and Fitelson, “Evidence of Evidence is not (Nec-
essarily) Evidence.” As a slogan, (EEE) has three occurrences of ‘evidence’: evidence1 of evidence2 is evidence3. 
But only two appear in the principle as formulated above.
 This is why eyewitness testimony is admissible as evidence while hearsay is not. The difference between the two 47
is not that the former is necessarily more reliable than the latter. We may trust the report of a usually reliable source 
more than we do the eyewitness testimony of one we suspect of inattention or perjury. But the eyewitness testimony 
is given under oath, whereas what the reliable source says is not (even if the report that he said it is). Thus, speaking 
de jure, the veracity of the former is guaranteed in a way that of the latter is not. Hence only the former is deemed 
probative evidence. (Of course, de facto, perjury is always possible. But that does not affect the point.)  
 David Enoch, “Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Dis48 -
agreement,” Mind 119, 476 (2010), 981. Enoch argues that there is no general recipe for how to respond to peer dis-
agreement and that, partly for that reason, the notion is of less interest than is generally thought. While we have ar-
gued that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as peer disagreement, we agree with both these points with respect 
to near-peer disagreement, even though our reasons are very different from his.
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b)  Evidence and content  
Certainly, your not believing that p gives me reason to re-examine the evidence on which 
I base my belief that p and my assessment of that evidence. And, if I have reason to think that 
you may be my epistemic superior, it may even give me reason to defer to you, pending – or 
lacking the opportunity for – such re-examination. Relying on experts is generally good policy 
and often unavoidable. But believing something on mere authority is not the same thing as be-
lieving something on the basis of evidence. For the latter, there must be what we may call a con-
tent-connection between one’s evidence/ground and one’s belief. Roughly, one must think that p 
is true because one thinks that what is adduced as evidence for it is true and is evidence that 
speaks in favour of p. That connection is missing when one bases a belief on mere authority, 
however reasonable and prudent doing so may be. If I think that p is true because I trust the ex-
pert who declares it to be so, I do not, Euthyphro-like, think that it is his so declaring it that 
makes it true. But that he so declares is all Feldman’s slogan gives us, even when ‘evidence2’ is 
read as ‘good evidence’ (indeed, even if it is read factively, as entailing p). Put simply, even if 
my believing that you have good evidence that p is false is enough to give me reason to believe 
that p is false, neither my so believing nor your actually having what I believe you to have is evi-
dence for me that p is false. To have that, I have to know what your evidence is and see it as pro-
bative of p.  Unless I have done so, you are still the sole possessor of the evidence in question. 49
Considerations concerning explanatoriness may help here. If I have good evidence that p, 
the evidence I have is explained (albeit defeasibly) by p’s being true. My having it is not so ex-
 Some may take this distinction to be between direct and indirect or prima facie evidence, rather than evidence and 49
good reason. (See, for instance, Siegel, “Argumentation and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” 144-145, fn. 1.) 
We believe that there is no such thing as indirect evidence. However, suppose there were. Our case against (EEE) 
would still hold. Suppose we modify (EEE) as 
(EEE)*  Evidence that S’s near-peer disbelieves that p is indirect evidence against p. 
The problem with (EEE)* is that it is too weak. It does not matter whether you call it indirect or prima facie 
evidence, or even just (good) reason, as we did. If all that near-peer disagreement gives us is indirect evidence, then 
there is nothing substantive about (EEE)*. As a matter of fact, (EEE)* is a truism! Nobody has ever denied that a 
near-peer’s disagreement gives one reason (or, indirect evidence) to pause and re-examine one's evidence. To deny 
that would be tantamount to endorsing a full-blooded dogmatism. If that is all the Total Evidence View has to say, we 
have no objection. But to defend the claim that we are no longer justified in our belief after our near-peer disagrees 
with us we need something much stronger, that is, we need evidence that, once added to our original body of evi-
dence, makes it inconsistent,. We need (EEE), rather than (EEE)*. 
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plained.  My having evidence that you disbelieve p is not explained by p’s being false, even if 50
you do have the evidence you claim to have and even if that evidence is good evidence that p is 
false. Even if you tell me what your evidence is, and even if that evidence is explained by p’s 
being false and I see that it is, the explanans of my having the evidence I have is your telling me 
that you do, not p’s being false. The only evidence (EEE) allows me is evidence of the fact of 
your disagreement. That is not explained by p’s being false, even if the evidence you have is. 
And I am in no position to know whether it is, just because you say that it is. I may or may not 
believe you.  If I do, I may well defer to you, but that would be for the substantive reason that, 
thinking that you are my epistemic superior, I think your evidence likely to be good, not because 
the concept of evidence demands it. The lack of an explanatory connection is a reflection of a 
lack of what we have called a content-connection between the evidence I have about your atti-
tude to p and p.  51
 Let us suppose that my evidence that you do not believe what I believe is that you tell me 
so.  First, I have no way to tell whether you are telling the truth. More important, if you say that 
you do not believe as I do because you have evidence against what I believe, I have no way to 
tell whether the evidence you claim to have really is evidence against what I believe. If I found 
out what it was, I may not see it as evidence against what I believe. Of course, it is possible that 
you would be right and I wrong. But for the evidence that you have evidence against my belief to 
be something I see as evidence against my belief (and thus as relevant to my epistemic conduct, 
as (EEE) is supposed to be) you must really have evidence that I see as evidence against it.  Your 
saying that you do is not by itself evidence that you do; hence I do not thereby have evidence 
against my belief. This is so even if it is probable that you are right and even if I think that you 
 The pavement’s being wet is explained by its having rained; my seeing that the pavement is wet is explained not 50
by that but by my looking at it, etc. It is not that its having rained may not be part of the total explanation, as may the 
work of the night street-cleaning crew. But whichever explains the pavement’s being wet, it is not what explains my 
seeing that it is.
 Take the congressman investigated for influence-peddling. He is asked whether he was ever at the hotel where he 51
is alleged to have received the bribe. Knowing that he is likely to have been seen leaving the hotel more than once, 
he takes the fifth. Evidence that he has something to hide, certainly: but it is philandering, rather than corruption. It 
would be hasty to conclude that the evidence we have that he has some evidence concerning the allegation is evi-
dence that he is guilty, when the evidence he has in fact exonerates him of that charge.
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are right. Even if the latter gives me reason to defer, that does not mean that I have been given 
evidence against the proposition I believed before discovering your belief concerning it.  
 What is missing here is precisely what is guaranteed (de jure) with eye-witness testimony. 
Being under oath, a witness can be assumed to be truthful in a way that the source of hearsay 
cannot. This means that a witness’ saying that he saw the accused commit the crime is as good as 
my seeing it and thus counts as evidence of his guilt. His reporting that someone said that he 
witnessed the crime is not. In other words, we assume that there is a content-connection between 
the eye-witness testimony that p and p.  52
Suppose that I have probative evidence1 that my near-peer thinks he has probative evi-
dence that p is false. According to (EEE), this entails that I have probative evidence2 that p is 
false. This can be the case only if his evidence is probative. In order for me to think that it is I 
must either know what evidence2 is and take it to be evidence that p is false or take my near-peer 
to be my epistemic superior. If I do the latter, that does give me reason to believe that p is false. 
But it does not give me evidence that it is. Even if I do take my near-peer to be my epistemic su-
perior and thus regard his evidence as probative, that still does not entail that I have evidence2 
that p is false. Given that I do not know what his evidence is, my belief is based on mere authori-
ty. And while that, as we have allowed, may give me a good reason to believe that p is false, it 
does not give me (probative) evidence that it is for want of a content-connection between the ev-
idence I have (evidence1) and p. On the other hand, suppose that I know what his evidence is and 
take it to be good evidence that p is false. Now it can be said that I do have evidence that p is 
false, except that it is not evidence2, as it does not flow from evidence1, that is, from the fact that 
I have evidence that my near-peer has evidence that p is false. If I know what his evidence is and 
judge it to be good, that is because I see a content-connection between it and p and thus believe 
that p is false because his evidence is as it is. However, its being as it is is obviously not entailed 
 Fitelson, in offering counter-examples to various ways of understanding the claim that evidence1 of evidence2 is 52
evidence3, seems to recognize the lack of content-connection we have been pointing to. He describes cases in which 
evidence1 is epistemically irrelevant to p in that it does not raise p’s epistemic probability, thus “… nothing p-sup-
porting [i]s part of” the evidence1 one has. We agree, but we are puzzled by the parenthetical ‘necessarily’ in the title 
of Fitelson’s paper. We think such considerations show that evidence1 in and of itself is never evidence2 that p in 
cases disagreement. For more on Fitelson’s case, see Lampert and Biro, “What is Evidence of Evidence Evidence 
of?”.
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by my near-peer’s thinking that it is. Thus (EEE) fails either way, whether I take my near-peer to 
be my superior or not. 
 As we have already emphasized, this is not to say that your telling me that you have evi-
dence against what I believe cannot, even by itself, be reason for changing my mind. If I think 
you trustworthy, and examining the evidence you claim to have would be impractical, that may 
be the reasonable thing to do. But none of this is of any help to (EEE). That I have reason to sus-
pend judgment, or even defer to you, in the face of evidence that you have evidence against a 
proposition I believed before gaining my evidence does not mean that I have evidence against 
the proposition. Consider another case of Feldman’s, that of the two detectives, one of whom has 
what he believes is evidence incriminating Righty, with the other thinking that he has evidence 
convicting Lefty. Suppose that the evidence on the basis of which the first concludes that Righty 
is the culprit was planted by Tricky. We can concede that that evidence, were it genuine, would 
(tend to) prove Righty guilty and also that our first detective, having no reason to suspect a 
frame-up, is justified in believing that he is. We would draw the same conclusion in his place. 
This does not make it true that the evidence he has is actually evidence that Righty is guilty and 
if we know that it is a plant we do not so regard it.  Should the second detective do so on finding 53
that the first has what he takes to be evidence against Righty? Since he does not know – any 
more than does the first detective – that the evidence is phony and has no reason to suspect that it 
may be, the right thing for him may well be to suspend judgment, at least pending further inves-
tigation. But that does not mean that he now has evidence that Righty is guilty. Furthermore, 
even if Righty were guilty, his being so, even if it explained the first detective’s evidence, would 
not explain the evidence the second detective has about the first.  
 Two central facts about what we are calling probative evidence are, first, that no evidence 
can be such evidence for me if I do not know what it is and, second, that someone’s (even an ex-
pert’s) thinking that something is the case is not evidence that it is the case. (EEE) fails to respect 
both these facts. First, it asserts that your having some evidence, I know not what, counts as evi-
 We have evidence – Shakespeare says so – that Othello sees the handkerchief he had given Desdemona in Cas53 -
sio’s hands and takes that as evidence of her infidelity. Were we not aware of Iago’s machinations, we might, too. 
As it is, we know that it is not. 
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dence for me. Second, it says not just that your thinking that something is the case is evidence 
that it is but something even stronger, namely, that your thinking that you have evidence that 
something is the case is evidence that it is. In fact, one’s having evidence and one’s thinking that 
one has evidence are independent of each other: not only is it possible to think that one has evi-
dence that p and fail to have it, it is also possible to have evidence that  p and fail to realize that 
one has it. 
c) Evidence and having evidence 
Tal and Comesaña have recently argued that while (EEE) is false on most understandings 
of it (including Feldman’s own), there is one interpretation on which it is true, but trivial.  Their 54
criticisms of other interpretations, as well as their defence of their own, rests on two distinctions 
they make. The first is that between someone’s having evidence and there being evidence 
(which, perhaps, no-one has). The second is between de re and de dicto readings of (EEE).  Tal 55
and Comesaña argue that (EEE) is true (only) if interpreted as saying that my having evidence 
that you have evidence that p is evidence that there is something that is evidence that p. This 
does not entail that I have evidence that p and thus does not require that I know what your evi-
dence is. 
 See Eyal Tal and Juan Comesaña, “Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?” Nous 51, 1, (2017): 95-112.54
 The relevant version of (EEE), according to Tal and Comesaña, is the following: 55
(Existential EEE1 de dicto): ∀(e)∀(p)∀(S)∀(α > 0)∀(β > 0)((F(e,∃(e')(T(e') ∧  F(e',p,α)),β)) → ∃(γ > 0)
(F(e,p,γ))) 
which is to be read as “for all e and p, if e is evidence that there is evidence e' for p, then e is evidence for p,” Tal 
and Comesaña, “Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?”, 102. Their own version, however, is this: 
(Existential EEE1 de dicto no defeat): ∀(e)∀(p)∀(α >0)∀(β >0)∀(γ >0)(F(e,∃(e')(T(e') ∧  F(e',p,α)),β) ∧ 
(F(e ∧ ∃(e')(T(e') ∧ F(e',p,α),p,γ )) → ∃(δ > 0)(F(e,p,δ)) 
which is to be  read as “for all e and p, if (i) e is evidence that there is evidence for p and (ii) e is not a defeater for 
the support that the proposition that there is evidence for p provides for p, then e is evidence for p,” Tal and Come-
saña, “Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?”, 108. As will become clear, our criticism applies to both versions.
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 As far as the first of these distinctions goes, we agree that there being evidence does not 
entail that someone has it.  But someone’s having evidence does entail there being evidence un56 -
less we read the first non-probatively. But even if we assume that I have probative evidence that 
you have evidence that p, my evidence shows that there is evidence that p in the probative sense 
only if the evidence you have is probative. Tal and Comesaña assume that it is.  But, as we have 57
already argued, to have evidence that there is probative evidence one has to know what the evi-
dence supposedly probative is and to judge it probative. Doing this requires knowing what the 
evidence in question is, rather than just have evidence that, whatever it is, it exists, which is all 
(EEE) allows. Knowing what the evidence is is tantamount to having it. 
Tal and Comesaña say that  
…evidence that there is evidence for p may be sufficient for counting as evidence for p 
even if nobody has it (suppose, for instance, that all the researchers involved in studying 
whether p declare that they found excellent evidence for p, but then die before telling us 
what the evidence is).  58
But “declare that they found evidence” does not mean that they have probative evidence, howev-
er excellent they say it is. It does not even entail that  there is evidence probative or non-proba-
tive. The researchers may be mistaken in thinking that what they have is evidence even in the 
non-probative sense. Suppose the value of neither one of two variables  they think is evidence of 
their hypothesis really is such., They may be mis-reading a measurement, taking it to give the 
value of one of the variables when in fact it gives that of the other. Then they do not even have 
 And one can even have evidence that there is evidence that p without having evidence that someone has evidence 56
that p. Suppose I have (non-probative) evidence that you, having killed your shipmate, threw the murder weapon 
into the sea. This is evidence that there is evidence that you are guilty; alas, no-one has it or, probably, ever will.
 Actually, they make it clear that they think of evidence as factive: “We will assume here that someone has a 57
proposition as evidence only if that proposition is true… To make the factivity transparent, we will symbolize that 
subject S has evidence E with ’T(e) ∧  S(e).’” (4) If ‘evidence’ in both ’S has evidence’ and ‘there is evidence’ is 
factive, the first clearly entails the second.  (EEE) may be true interpreted as saying that if one has evidence that 
entails that one’s peer has evidence that entails that p one has evidence that p. But since one never has such evi-
dence, so interpreted it is useless as a guide to epistemic conduct. 
 Tal and Comesaña, “Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?”, 103. We have avoided the locution ‘evidence for p,’ 58
preferring ‘evidence that p,’ as substituting for ‘p’ yields ‘evidence that it is raining’ in the latter but the nonsensical 
‘evidence for it is raining’ in the former.  
 23
non-probative evidence, even though they think they do. 
 Regarding the second distinction, between de re and de dicto readings of (EEE), Tal and 
Comesaña say the following: 
Just as there is a difference between believing that a specific person is a spy and believing 
the existential proposition that there are spies, there is an analogous difference between e 
being evidence for a specific proposition which is evidence for p, and e being evidence 
for the existential proposition that there is evidence for p.  59
On the de re reading, (EEE) entails that the one for whom evidence1 of evidence2 is sup-
posed to be evidence3 knows what evidence2 is. If so, it is not the evidence that someone else has 
it or that it exists that is evidence that p but evidence2 itself.  On this reading, in having E1 one eo 
ipso has E2, making the first E of (EEE) idle. On the other hand, since on the de dicto reading 
(which Tal and Comesaña argue is the correct one) it is not specified what the evidence that p is, 
one cannot judge whether it is probative. Not being able to do that means that one does not have 
evidence that p. It may be the case that there is evidence that p and that the experts had it. There 
may also be, as Tal and Comesaña suggest, such a thing as evidence that no one has. Neither is 
any help to (EEE). The experts’ declaration may, of course, give others excellent reason to accept 
p. But it does not give them evidence that p.  
Not only does evidence that someone has evidence that p fall short of being evidence that 
p, sometimes it stands in the way of having evidence that p. Think about Lois Lerner’s taking the 
fifth at the recent congressional hearings on the IRS’ allegedly targeting conservative organiza-
tions. Her doing so is evidence that (she thinks) there is evidence to support the allegations. Yet 
not only does the committee not have such evidence as a result of her declining to answer ques-
tions, her exercising the right to do so is intended (by both her and the Constitution) to make sure 
that it does not. The committee – and we – have ample reason to be suspicious. But that is not the 
 Tal and Comesaña, “Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?”,  97. They offer the following formalizations for the two 59
readings: 
(e is evidence that there is de re evidence for p): ∃(e')∃(α > 0)∃(β > 0)(F(e,e',α) ∧ F(e’,p,β)). 
(e is evidence that there is de dicto evidence for p): ∃(α > 0)∃(β > 0)(F(e,∃(e')(T(e') ∧ F(e’,p,α)),β).
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same thing as having evidence, which is why the committee is demanding to see Lerner’s e-mail 
messages and she is refusing to let them.  
What about Tal and Comesaña’s distinction between having evidence and there being ev-
idence, though? Is her refusal not evidence that there is evidence against her, even if it is shielded 
from the committee? Well, no. She may think that there is and be mistaken. She may be badly 
advised by her attorney. Once again, the evidence we have that she (thinks) she has incriminating 
evidence may be a reason for thinking that she does, but it is not evidence that she does. (As 
President Obama so intriguingly put it, “there is not a shred of evidence” of wrong-doing.)  60
Thus (EEE) understood along the lines Tal and Comesaña recommend is as vulnerable to 
these objections as on any other interpretation. 
Conclusion 
 Disagreement between people who are peers strictly speaking is impossible. Disagree-
ment between people who are peers to all appearance is frequent, but we know that the appear-
ance is deceptive. Of course, knowing that one party must be epistemically superior is one thing, 
knowing which is another. While the latter can be hard to figure out, trying to do so is usually the 
proper response to disagreement. When that is impractical, we can choose between deferring to 
expertise, suspending judgment and agreeing to disagree, depending on the case and, in particu-
lar, on the importance and urgency of the matter. In whichever of these ways we respond, general 
principles of sensible epistemic conduct are all we need to rely on. We do not need (EEE) in ad-
dition to these. 
 Returning now to the question of dependence. If in the face of a near-peer’s disagreement 
all one needs are the general principles of sensible belief-formation, with the near-peer’s belief 
playing no evidential role, it cannot be said that in forming the belief one does on learning of the 
 Nothing hangs on the particulars of this case in its involving constitutional considerations. Hilary Clinton’s re60 -
fusal to make her private server available for inspection by an independent party may be seen as evidence that she 
has something to hide, but – happily or unhappily, take your pick – it is not evidence that she does, as she well 
knows.
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disagreement one is epistemically dependent. It is instructive to compare the situation with the 
genuine case of epistemic dependence we have when in forming our belief about something we 
take into account the opinion of an expert. We believe that the expert has evidence we do not 
have. The evidence we have of that is the independent evidence we have that he is an expert 
where we are not.  This is just what is missing in the case of near-pear disagreement. What alerts 
us to the fact that someone who appears to be our peer is not is the fact that he disagrees with us. 
That tells us that he is either our epistemic superior or our epistemic inferior, but it does not tell 
us which. It does not tell us even whether our epistemic difference consists in having different 
evidence, rather than differing assessment of our common evidence. But even if it happens that it 
is the former, we have no reason to believe that any evidence our disputant may have that we do 
not is probative evidence, something we assume with someone we believe, on good grounds, to 
be an expert. This is why we take his evidence into account in a way we have no reason to do 
with a near-pear’s. As we have argued, even if we have evidence that a near-peer has evidence 
against our belief, that gives us no evidence against our belief. Contrary to what (EEE) implies, 
we are not epistemically dependent on a near-peer who disagrees with us.  61
 We are grateful to Harvey Siegel, Pedro Merlussi, and Jonathan Matheson for many helpful comments on previ61 -
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